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WASHINGTON CASE LAW

Judge Hunter stresses the purpose of the constitutional provisions
-to protect against benefit to private parties at public expense. If
this be correct, private bodies might receive gifts or privileges when
the result would be to contribute primarily to the public welfare. He
suggests this on the theory that the benefits derived by the public are
23
a sufficient consideration for the "gift" or grant.
In any case, the fact that utilities have been granted free use of the
highways suggests that some gratuitous benefits-whether they be
privileges, immunities, gifts, or loaned credit-have been justified
when a public purpose is served. It is, of course, difficult to draw the
line between public purpose and private advantage, especially when
they are so often intermixed. The present decision, however, provides
little help in defining that line.
WAYNE BOOTH, JR.

CONTRACTS
Promissory Estoppel-Forbearance. The Washington court in
Weitman v. Grange Ins. Ass'n.,1 enforced a gratuitious promise by a
promisor-insurer that it would notify the promisee-insured of any lapse
or termination in his insurance coverage.
The promisee had the policy in his possession and thus knew the date
upon which the policy was to terminate. The date of termination
passed, but because of the insurer's promise the insured-promisee failed
to procure insurance which was available from another source. The
court held that the insured had not only relied in fact upon his insurer's
promise, but also that he had been legally entitled to do so. Consequently the insurer was obligated to pay for fire loss occuring after
the policy's termination date. The court stressed the fact that the
promisor had on two prior occasions notified the promisee that his
insurance coverage was suspended. It had little difficulty in determining that on the date of policy termination the promisee could again
rely on the promised notice.
The Weitman decision suggests that the Washington court may have
23 State Highway Comm'n v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wn2d 216, 227,
367 P.2d 605, 612 (1961) (dissenting opinion) ; State ex rel. Tattersal v. Yelle, 52

Wn.2d 856, 329 P2d 841 (1958).
159 Wn.2d 748, 370 P2d 587 (1962).
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clarified its thinking about one detail of enforcing gratuitous promises.
That is, that forbearance is a sufficient change of position2 by the
promisee to hold the promisor to his promise. The Washington court
has frequently recognized' the promissory estoppel doctrine of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part
of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
However, in Hazlett v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n4 (an earlier
case with facts similar to Weitman, but which was not discussed or
cited in Weitman) the court considered arguments based upon the
Restatement theory and found them inapplicable. It said that promissory estoppel is available only if the promisee can show sufficient
forbearance, 5 a showing not made in the case at bar.
Hazlett involved an oral promise to obtain insurance. The plaintiffmortgagor had applied to defendant mortgagee for a loan, for which the
property in question was to be security. The mortgage provided that
the mortgagor was to keep the property insured and that the mortgagee
was not responsible for failure to have insurance placed upon the
premises. When the subject of insurance arose during negotiations, the
mortgagee indicated he would "take care" of it along with other details
necessary to complete the transaction. The mortgagee failed to procure
any insurance, but the mortgagor believed the mortgagee's statement to
be a promise and, relying upon it, failed to take any action himself.
Subsequently, a fire destroyed the property. When the mortgagor
brought an action to recover for breach of contract, the Washington
Supreme Court found for the defendant. After stating that the parol
evidence rule prevented admission of the oral promise as evidence
to interpret the mortgage agreement, the court went on to say that
even if the oral promise had been independent and subsequent, it was
2That forbearance can be a change of position seems paradoxical. However,
"change of position" is more illustrative than "reliance" that the promisee has failed
to take action to protect his rights.
3 Recognized but not applied in Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wn.2d 454,
287 P.2d 735 (1955) ; Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn.2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949) ; State v.
Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d 1, 182 P.2d 643 (1947). Recognized and applied
in Luther v. National Bank of Commerce, 2 Wn.2d 470, 98 P.2d 667 (1940).
4 14 Wn.2d 124, 127 P.2d 273 (1942).
5 To the court in Hazlett sufficient forbearance meant only "active" forbearance.
Since forbearance means failure to act, it seems meaningless to say that forbearance
can be either "passive" or "active."
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gratuitous and unenforceable.' The court noted that gratuitous
promises were enforceable if the promisor had begun to perform or
if he was in fact a broker or insurance agent. Since neither exception7
applied, the promise in Hazlett was not enforced.
The impact of Hazlett on the Washington law of gratuitous promises
was two-fold. First, by blind adherence to stare decisis in relying on
Hudson v. Ellsworth8 it gave new vitality in this jurisdiction to the then
obsolete9 gratuitous agency and bailment theories. 0 Its second effect
was two-fold. First, by blind adherence to stare decisis in relying on
arising from the court's choice of language." This second effect of
Hazlett arose because of the court's eagerness to adhere to its past
position, even though the promisee had in this case argued promissory
estoppel to the court. To sustain its gratuitous agency premise the
court was forced to refute the promissory estoppel argument. This
was done in a summary fashion after a review of the Restatement
6The court relied upon Hudson v. Ellsworth, 56 Wash. 243, 105 Pac. 463 (1909), a
decision during a period of contract law when the courts enforced gratuitous promises
only if a bailment or agency relationship could be found, and only if the promisor only
had begun performance of his promise. Finally legal scholars, recognizing in actuality
the courts were giving effect to a justified change of position by the promisee relying
upon the promise, formulated the Restatement doctrine. See 4 ALI PROCEEDINGS 107
(1926). For a discussion of the historical evolution of the promissory estoppel principle
See Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principalfrom Precedents 50 MicH. L. REv. 639,
873 (1952) ; Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ? MIcH. L. Rxv. 908
(1937).
7
(Each of these exceptions presents a situation which makes it easily ascertainable
to the court that the promisor by initiating his act is inviting reliance by the
promisee. Before the Restatement rule was drafted, the courts required extensive
activity by the promisor before the promisee would be justified in relying upon the
promise to the extent of obtaining enforcement. See Shattuck, Gratuitous ProinisesA New Writ? 35 MIcrE. L. Rxv. 908 (1937).
8 56 Wash. 243, 105 Pac. 463 (1909).
0
An obsolescence that in some jurisdictions has not been realized because the purpose
of Restatement § 90 has not been comprehended. Recent decisions based upon that
theory are: Lester v. Marshall, 143 Colo. 189, 352 P.2d 866 (1959); Brunelle v.
Nashua Building & Loan Ass'n, 95 N.H. 391, 64 A.2d 315 (1949) ; Spiegel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 91, 160 N.E2d 40 (1959) ; Dallas Title & Guaranty
Co. v. Jarrell, 320 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
10 These theories refuse to hold the gratuitous agent or bailee liable on the basis
of an executory promise. The situation changes, however, if the promisor has begun
to carry out his promise. The relationship which is then established requires the gratuitous agent or bailee to act with "due care." No change in effect on the promisee
occurs. In each situation (whether executory or executed) the promisee relies upon
the promised performance and is injured because of his reliance. In one instance the
promisor takes no action (he may, for example, fail to procure insurance) but he is
not liable because he has not undertaken to do anything. However, should the promisor
begin performance under the gratuitous agency theory, as obtaining insufficient
coverage or an invalid policy, then the promisor has failed to use "due care" and will
be liable. In each case the injury and reliance are identical; the only difference is
that the court can say in the latter case that the promisor should be able to expect
the promisee's reliance. See, Boyer, Promissory Estoppel, Principalfrom Precedents
50 MIcEr. L. Rxv. 639, 873 (1952); Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-a New Writ?
35 MICr. L. Rxv. 908 (1937).
"1 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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illustrations. 2 Since the court could not find among them an active"
forbearance example, it concluded "Surely, forbearance was not
intended to include the mere passive failure of the promisee to procure
elsewhere, or by other means, the service or the thing promised."14 This
failure to comprehend what is meant by forbearance may be excused
not only by the compelling commands of stare decisis, but also by
realizing that the court was looking at the Restatement at the threshold of its development. Had the court endeavored to determine the
basis of the Restatement definition, it would have learned that the
purpose of Section 90, in clarifying 5 an uncertain area of contract law,
was to enforce promises such as that made in the Hazlett case." Now
twenty years later, the Weitman case demonstrates that the court is
re-oriented on the forbearance question, as it has accepted without
question what was contemplated as forbearance by the Restatement
framers.
Decisions from other jurisdictions support the Weitman position. In
Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co." the plaintiff re(1932), Illustrations:
"1. A promises B not to foreclose for a specific time, a mortgage which A holds
on B's land. B thereafter makes improvements on the land. A's promise is
binding.
"2. A promises B to pay him an annuity during B's life. B thereupon resigns a
profitable employment, as A expected that he might. B receives the annuity
for some years, in the meantime becoming disqualified from again obtaining
good employment. A's promise is binding.
"3. A promises B that if B will go to college and complete his course he will give
him $5000. B goes to college and has nearly completed his course when A
notifies him of an intention to revoke the promise. A's promise is binding.
"4. A promises B $5000, knowing that B desires that sum for the purchase of
Blackacre. Induced thereby, B secures without any payment an option to
buy Blackacre. A then tells B that he withdraws his promise. A's promise
is not binding."
13 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
14 14 Wn.2d 124, 131, 127 P.2d 273, 277 (1942).
15 Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243
at 1252, n.25 (1938) : "Is § 90 of the Contracts Restatement, or § 45 a 'new' doctrine?
The cases say: Both are rather belated explicit doctrine." See 4 ALI PROCEEDINGS
106 (1926). There Professor Williston explains that the cases involving reliance on
gratuitous promises are a special group and that if the law in this area is to be simplified then section 88 (present section 90) must be included within the Contracts
Restatement.
16 While the illustrations at note 12 supra do not present a situation where, through
failure to act, the promisee has manifested a reliance, it does not seem likely that
the Restatement doctrine was meant to exclude such a form of reliance. Non-existence
of such an example presented the court with an easy basis for distinguishing the Restatement proposition deciding Haslett on the basis of stare decisis. This observation
is based upon ALI PROCEEDINGS 106-109 (1926) where Professor Williston discusses
cases which he felt came within the Restatement doctrine. Among these was "a recent
New York case" which allowed recovery from promisee's reliance on a promise to
procure insurance. Forbearance from procuring insurance was sufficient reliance to
allow recovery. The case alluded to must be Siegel v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479,
138 N.E. 414 (1923).
"7 164 Miss. 693, 145 So. 623 (1933).
12 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90
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lied upon a confidential pamphlet distributed to it by Universal Credit
Co. This pamphlet stated that when dealers repossessed cars from
delinquent purchasers "insurance protection for dealers interest will
continue in force until such account is liquidated, after which the
dealer should provide such insurance as he may require." The plaintiff, a dealer, refrained from procuring insurance. After the repossessed automobiles were damaged, suit was initiated and the Mississippi
court, without discussion and relying solely on the Restatement theory,
held that the forbearance in reliance on the circular's representation
was sufficient.
s a widow promised to
In W. B. Saunders Co. v. Galbraith,"
pay her
deceased spouse's debt to the plaintiff, who refrained from filing a
claim against deceased's estate. Thereafter, the widow gave a note
and mortgage to secure the debt. When the plaintiff sued to foreclose,
the defense was want of consideration. The Ohio court refused to
entertain the defense, saying that the promise reasonably induced the
plaintiff to forbear asserting its claim against the estate at a time when
it would have been effective. 9 While the number of appellate decisions
on the forbearance element is small the decisions evidence a proclivity
to follow the expressed intention of the American Law Institute.20
KENNETH 0. JARVI
1840 Ohio App. 155, 178 N.E. 34 (1931).
loIn contrast to the Washington court in Hazlett, the Ohio court accepted the
Restatement approach enthusiastically, saying; "we are content, however, to take the
restatement as the law of this state without exploring its soundness, and hold that
of its own vigor it is adequate authority." Id. at 156, 178 N.E. at 35-36 (1931).
See McCowen v. McCord, 49 Ga. App. 358, 175 S.E. 593 (1934) for a similar result
on nearly identical facts, and Schafer v. Fraser, 207 Or. 446, 290 P.2d 190 (1955)
where the court concludes that reliance upon an attorney's promise to prorate the
cost of a law suit among several litigations was sufficient reason for promisee's forbearance from seeking alternative relief.
20 Within the past fifteen years, California has developed a substantial body of'law
on this point of the Restatement doctrine.
In Van Hook v. Southern California Waiters Alliance, Local 17, 158 Cal. App.2d
556, 323 P2d 212 (1958), a union officer had been promised by the local that he
would get retirement benefits if he remained with the local. He refused an outside
position. This forbearance was sufficient; the court enforced the contract when the
union failed to provide the retirement benefits. For other promises involving retirement benefits which were enforced under section 90 involving identical forbearance
see West v. Hunt Foods, 101 Cal.App.2d 597, 225 P.2d 978 (1950) and Hunter v.
Sparling, 87 Cal.App.2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948). The Federal court has also enforced this type of promise, Gill v. U.S. Rubber Co., 195 F.Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
Graddon v. Knight, 138 Cal.App.2d 577, 292 P.2d 632 (1956) involved an implied
promise by the bank to the borrower that the bank would insure the residence upon
which the loan was sought. Relying upon this promise the borrower failed to procure
insurance. The court held the promise enforceable under section 90.
In Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 410, 258 P2d 497 (1953) a pledgor
refrained from redeeming a valuable coat, relying upon the pledgee's promise to hold
the coat for another week. When the coat was sold within the week the pledgor
was allowed to recover under the Restatement.
Edmonds v. Los Angeles County, 40 Cal.2d 642, 255 P.2d 772 (1953) involved a

